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PARDONS AND THE THEORY OF THE “SECOND-BEST” 
Chad Flanders* 
Abstract 
This Article explains and defends a “second-best” theory of pardons. 
Pardons are second-best in two ways. First, pardons are second-best 
because they represent, in part, a response to a failure of justice: the 
person convicted was not actually guilty, or he or she was punished too 
harshly, or the punishment no longer fits the crime. In the familiar 
analogy, pardons act as a “safety valve” on a criminal justice system 
that doesn’t work as it ideally should. Pardons, in the nonideal world we 
live in, are sometimes necessary. 
But pardons are also second-best because they can represent 
deviations from other values we hold dear in the criminal law: fairness, 
consistency, and nonarbitrariness. Pardons can all too often reflect 
patterns of racial bias, favoritism, and sheer randomness, both when 
they are given too generously and when they are not given generously 
enough. So we need to have a theory of how the pardoning power 
should be used, even when it is used to correct obvious injustices in the 
criminal justice system. 
This Article takes up the task of showing how pardons are justified, 
but more importantly, this Article also theorizes how pardons should be 
used. Specifically, it introduces two constraints on the pardon power, 
one that constrains pardons when we consider them individually and 
another that constrains pardons when we consider them as a whole. It is 
this latter ground that has especially been underdeveloped in the 
literature, and this Article provides grounds for evaluating pardons not 
merely taken one-by-one, but when more than one pardon is given out 
at a time, or over the course of an administration.  
 
                                                                                                                     
 * Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law; Visiting Fulbright 
Lecturer in Law, Nanjing University, China (2012–2013). I am grateful to Jeff Redding, Efthimi 
Parasidis, Monica Eppinger, and the members of the Washington University Junior Faculty 
Workshop, especially John Inazu, Zoe Robinson, Max Helveston, and Daniel Morales. They 
convinced me that my first go at this project was hopelessly wrong. I hope to have done better 
this time. William Baude and Christopher Bradley helped me to better frame my argument, and 
Zach Hoskins gave me incisive comments on a near-final draft. Justin Hansford provided 
helpful bibliographical guidance early on, and Dan Markel clarified a few points for me near the 
end. Lastly, correspondence with Ronen Avraham helped focus my thoughts on the issue of 
“comparative desert.”  
Thanks also to Yiqing Wang of Nanjing University and to Alex Muntges of Saint Louis 
University for excellent and timely research assistance. Research on this Article was generously 
supported by a summer research grant from Saint Louis University School of Law. All errors are 
my own.  
1
Flanders: Pardons and the Theory of the “Second-Best”
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
1560 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 1560 
 I. A DEFENSE OF THE PARDONING POWER .............................. 1566 
  A. Moore’s Theory of Pardons ........................................ 1567 
  B. An Objection Briefly Considered ................................ 1570 
  C. Justifying Haley Barbour’s Pardons ........................... 1571 
 II. PROBLEMS WITH PARDONS EN MASSE ................................. 1574 
  A. Some Problematic Pardons ......................................... 1574 
   1. Racist Pardons ...................................................... 1574 
   2. Pardoning “Favorites” .......................................... 1576 
   3. Random Pardons .................................................. 1577 
   4. Pardons for the Wrong Reasons ........................... 1579 
  B. Barbour’s Pardons Revisited ...................................... 1581 
  C. Some Recent Presidential Pardons ............................. 1583 
 III. TOWARD A SECOND-BEST THEORY OF PARDONS ................ 1585 
  A. Ideal and Nonideal Theory .......................................... 1586 
  B. Applying Nonideal Theory to Pardons ........................ 1588 
  C. Two Important Qualifications ..................................... 1591 
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................... 1594 
INTRODUCTION 
In January 2012, near the end of his term of office, Mississippi 
Governor Haley Barbour gave some form of executive clemency 
(pardon, early release, or suspension of sentences) to nearly two 
hundred people.1 Although the move was nearly unprecedented in 
Mississippi,2 the Mississippi Supreme Court later upheld it against a 
procedural challenge.3 The “pardons” (as I shall collectively call them, 
following most reporters) were—and properly remain—intensely 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Richard Fausset, Outgoing Gov. Haley Barbour’s Pardons Shock Mississippi, L.A. 
TIMES (Jan. 12, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/12/nation/la-na-barbour-pardons-
20120113; Mississippi Gov. Haley Barbour Pardons Nearly 200, Including Convicted Killers, 
CRIMESIDER (Jan. 11, 2012, 4:44 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-57357252-
504083/mississippi-gov-haley-barbour-pardons-nearly-200-including-convicted-killers. 
 2. Haley Barbour’s ‘Shocking’ Pardon Spree: A Guide, WEEK (Jan. 13, 2012), 
http://theweek.com/article/index/223306/haley-barbours-shocking-pardon-spree-a-guide (stating 
that the previous pardon high for a Mississippi governor was thirteen).  
 3. See In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d 401, 403 (Miss. 2012) (“[W]e are compelled to hold 
that—in each of the cases before us—it fell to the governor alone to decide whether the 
Constitution’s publication requirement was met.”); Holbrook Mohr, Haley Barbour Pardons: 
Mississippi Supreme Court Rules Pardons Are Valid, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 8, 2012, 6:19 
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/08/haley-barbour-pardons-mississippi-supreme-
court_n_1332769.html. 
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controversial.4 There was ample evidence that Barbour had “played 
favorites” in handing out the pardons. Some of those pardoned had 
personal connections to the Governor through Mississippi’s 
controversial “trusty” program;5 others Barbour pardoned were 
“members of prominent Mississippi families, major Republican donors 
or others from the higher social strata of Mississippi life.”6 One 
individual pardoned was football great Brett Favre’s brother, who had 
been convicted of killing a friend in a drinking-and-driving accident.7 
Taken as a whole, the pardons also showed a disturbing racial 
distribution. Nearly two-thirds of the pardons during Barbour’s tenure 
were granted to whites, even though the majority of those convicted of 
crimes in Mississippi are black.8  
In his public statements, Barbour gave only a vague theological 
justification for his mass pardons, saying that Christians believe people 
can be redeemed and deserve a second chance.9 He added that the 
                                                                                                                     
 4. Fausset, supra note 1 (“The actions have brought criticism from victims’ families, 
everyday Mississippians like [local resident Terrance] Winters, and Democratic officials 
including Jim Hood, the state attorney general, who persuaded a judge to put some of the 
pardons on hold.”). 
 5. “Trusties” were convicts who worked for the Governor, at his mansion, doing routine 
maintenance and landscaping. The program has since been abolished by Barbour’s successor. 
Jessica Bakeman, Miss. Governor Ends Controversial Mansion Trusty Program, USA TODAY 
(Jan. 20, 2012, 10:59 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-01-
20/mississippi/52694334/1. Barbour pardoned five people with life sentences—including four 
murderers—who had worked in the trusty program during his administration. See Rich Phillips, 
Controversy Puts Mississippi’s Long-standing ‘Trusty’ Program in Spotlight, CNN (Jan. 18, 
2012, 12:03 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/16/justice/mississippi-trusty-program. 
 6. Campbell Robertson & Stephanie Saul, List of Pardons Included Many Tied to Power, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/28/us/many-
pardon-applicants-stressed-connection-to-mississippi-governor.html.  
 7. Judy Keen, Barbour’s Pardons Stir Outrage in Mississippi, USA TODAY (Jan. 13, 
2012, 9:43 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-01-12/mississippi-
barbour-pardons/52511486/1 (“Among those pardoned was Earnest Scott Favre, brother of 
former NFL quarterback Brett Favre. He pleaded guilty to driving in front of a train while drunk 
in 1996, resulting in the death of his best friend.”).  
 8. Patrik Jonsson, Haley Barbour Pardons: Why Were the Forgiven So 
Disproportionately White?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 21, 2012), http://www.csmonitor 
.com/USA/2012/0121/Haley-Barbour-pardons-Why-were-the-forgiven-so-disproportionately-w 
hite (“Out of a total of 222 acts of clemency given by Barbour during his tenure . . . two-thirds 
benefited white prisoners. Meanwhile, two-thirds of the state’s prison population is black.”); see 
also Robertson & Saul, supra note 6 (“Yet in a state with the highest poverty rate in the nation, 
where nearly 70 percent of convicts are black, official redemption appears to have been attained 
disproportionately by white people and the well connected.”).  
 9. Haley Barbour, Statement of Former Governor Haley Barbour on Clemency, OFF. 
GOVERNOR HALEY BARBOUR, http://web.archive.org/web/20121023090030/ 
http://www.governorbarbour.com/news/2011/dec/1.13barbourclemencystatement.html (last 
visited Aug. 30, 2013). The Governor stated: 
Christianity teaches us forgiveness and second chances. I believe in second 
3
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pardon board had recommended many, if not all, of those pardoned for 
executive clemency.10 In an op-ed written later, Barbour defended the 
tradition of pardoning “trusties” and asserted that those who commit 
crimes of passion such as murder are least likely to re-offend and so are 
no longer dangers to society.11 Four of the trusties Barbour pardoned 
had been convicted of murder.12 
Such dramatic exercises of the pardon power such as Barbour’s raise 
deep and troubling questions not only about the pardons taken 
individually but also about the justifiability of the pardon power as a 
whole. When a governor pardons (whether an individual or a large 
group), he or she is making an exception to the laws that otherwise 
apply to everybody.13 Even pardons that look justifiable on their face 
(because a prisoner has suffered enough or because the governor deems 
a sentence against an individual to be too long or too harsh) may violate 
the governor’s duty to impartially administer the law.14 Taken to an 
extreme, this argument would even limit a governor’s ability to pardon 
in an error-correcting capacity (say, if someone were actually innocent), 
                                                                                                                     
chances, and I try hard to be forgiving.  
 The historic power of gubernatorial clemency by the Governor to pardon 
felons is rooted in the Christian idea of giving second chances. I’m not saying I’ll 
be perfect, that no one who received clemency will ever do anything wrong. I’m 
not infallible, and no one else is. But I’m very comfortable and totally at peace 
with these pardons, especially of the Mansion inmates.  
Id.  
 10. Id. (“The State Parole Board reviewed about ninety-five percent of these 215 cases as 
well as many, many more applications that were rejected. I accepted the Parole Board 
recommendations about ninety-five percent of the time.”). 
 11. Haley Barbour, Op-Ed, Why I Released 26 Prisoners, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2012), 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-01-18/opinions/35439863_1_inmates-clemency-
trusties. 
 12. Haley Barbour Pardons 4 Killers: Convicts Were Trustees at Miss. Governor 
Mansion, GRIO (Jan. 10, 2012, 11:21 AM), http://thegrio.com/2012/01/10/haley-barbour-
pardons-4-killers-convicts-were-trustees-at-miss-governor-mansion. 
 13. See KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
28 (1997) (summarizing Kant’s opposition to pardons, given that rulers have a “categorical 
moral obligation to punish those who have committed crimes”); see also Dan Markel, Against 
Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1455–56 (2004) (arguing against excessive discretion to reduce 
or remove sentences on retributivist grounds). In raising concerns about the possible 
arbitrariness of pardons, this Article is in broad sympathy with Markel’s thesis.  
 14. For an excellent statement of the tension between mercy (including pardons) and the 
rule of law norms of the administrative state, see Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the 
Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1334 (2008) (“[T]he 
rise of the administrative state has made unchecked discretion an anomaly in the law, and a 
phenomenon to be viewed with suspicion. The expansion of the administrative state has 
showcased the dangers associated with the exercise of discretion.”); id. at 1333 n.5 (collecting 
sources on the tension between mercy and justice). 
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provided that the correct procedures had been used.15 
Barbour’s pardons also came at an inconvenient time: when there 
have been increasing calls for executives—including and perhaps 
especially the President16—to increase the number of pardons granted.17 
The pardon power has been underused of late, especially by the current 
and former Presidents, perhaps in overreaction to certain manifestly 
political uses of the pardon, such as President Clinton’s infamous 
pardon of Marc Rich.18 But Barbour’s pardons seem to show, in an 
elaborate and troubling fashion, how mass pardons can go very wrong 
and would seem to condone, if not justify, executive hesitancy, delay, 
and general overcaution in pardoning.19 
This Article defends the pardoning power (especially against those 
who would find the power always unjustifiable) while finding that there 
are, and should be, strong moral limits to how it can be used. To see 
how the pardon power can be justified (and, as a result, how individual 
pardons are justified), we need to distinguish ideal from nonideal 
circumstances. In identifying a distinction, this Article borrows from 
and modifies the work of John Rawls.20 The distinction between ideal 
and nonideal circumstances is closely related to the idea of the “second-
best.”21  
                                                                                                                     
 15. See generally William Baude, Last Chance on Death Row, WILSON Q., Autumn 2010, 
at 18 (defending the value of finality in criminal proceedings with application to the Troy Davis 
case).  
 16. See Dafna Linzer, Obama Has Granted Clemency More Rarely Than Any Modern 
President, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 2, 2012, 9:00 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/obama-has-
granted-clemency-more-rarely-than-any-modern-president (commenting on the infrequent use 
of pardons by President Obama).  
 17. See generally Rachel E. Barkow, The Politics of Forgiveness: Reconceptualizing 
Clemency, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 153, 158 (2009) (calling for a “return to an era in which 
clemency is a key part of a functioning system of justice”); Clara H. Drinan, Clemency in a 
Time of Crisis, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1123, 1123 (2012) (arguing for greater use of pardon 
power); Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, 100 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1169, 1212 (2010) (“[P]ardon has important uses in the federal justice system, 
and recent experience has shown that a president who fails to pardon regularly throughout his 
term will have difficulty dealing with pent-up demand at its conclusion.”); PARDON POWER, 
http://www.pardonpower.com/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2013) (blog of P.S. Ruckman, Jr.).  
 18. Jessica Reeves, The Marc Rich Case: A Primer, TIME (Feb. 13, 2001), 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,99302,00.html (providing details of the 
controversial pardon of Marc Rich).  
 19. See Barkow, supra note 17, at 157 (noting political risks of pardoning).  
 20. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).  
 21. Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Second Best & Nonideal Theory, LEGAL 
THEORY BLOG (May 17, 2009), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2009/05/legal-theory-
lexicon-second-best-nonideal-theory.html (“Despite its technical origins, the idea behind the 
second best is very general: sometimes the ideal solution to a problem (or ‘optimal policy 
option’) is infeasible. The best should not be the enemy of the good; so, when the first-best 
policy option is unavailable, then normative legal theorists should consider second-best 
5
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In ideal or near-ideal circumstances sentences are for the most part 
just, and the criminal justice system works by and large in a fair 
manner. In an ideal society, there is virtually no need for pardons. But 
in nonideal circumstances, sentences tend to be overly long, harsh, or 
cruel, and the criminal justice system is biased against certain groups. I 
think it fairly obvious that we (in America, and perhaps other parts of 
the world22) exist in nonideal circumstances.23 In such a context, 
pardoning can be justified as a way to more perfectly approximate what 
the criminal justice system would accomplish in ideal circumstances—
by limiting unjust sentences, for example, or by removing unjustified 
post-conviction disabilities. This, indeed, is how pardons are commonly 
justified in the literature.24 
This justification does not end the enquiry, however, but only begins 
it, for it leaves open the question of what constraints on the pardon 
power may exist even in nonideal conditions. Even nonideal theory 
operates under some constraints—constraints on how far we can relax 
certain moral absolutes so as to more perfectly approximate ideal 
justice.25 If pardons are applied in a reckless and arbitrary manner, this 
may be impermissible, even under nonideal theory. This constraint on 
nonideal theory raises the possibility that the way Haley Barbour 
pardoned in general is unjustifiable, even if some (or all) of his 
individual pardons were fully justified. It also suggests that not 
pardoning at all could be better in some cases than pardoning in a 
discriminatory, biased, or random manner. 
This Article seeks to define a consensus in some areas of the 
criminal law but to challenge the consensus in others. In defending 
pardons, this Article tries to provide a minimal account of the pardon 
                                                                                                                     
solutions.”). For a different, though related use of second-best, see generally Adrian Vermuele, 
Hume’s Second-Best Constitutionalism, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 421 (2003).  
 22. The United States has the highest prison population in the world, with China a distant 
second. See World Prison Populations, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/uk/06 
/prisons/html/nn2page1.stm (last visited Mar. 21, 2013). 
 23. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN 
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (discussing the crisis of mass incarceration in America); 
WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011) (same); Adam 
Gopnik, The Caging of America: Why Do We Lock Up So Many People?, NEW YORKER (Jan. 
30, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/atlarge/2012/01/30/120130crat_atlarge_ 
gopnik (same).  
 24. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 14, at 1364 n.144 (collecting uses of the “safety valve” 
justification for pardons); George Lardner, Jr. & Margaret Colgate Love, Mandatory Sentences 
and Presidential Mercy: The Role of Judges in Pardon Cases, 1790–1850, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 
212, 212 (2004) (explaining the importance of having a “safety valve” in a system of mandatory 
punishments).  
 25. RAWLS, supra note 20, at 246 (“Existing institutions are to be judged in the light of 
[the ideal] conception and held to be unjust to the extent that they depart from it without 
sufficient reason.”). 
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power and in doing so tries to be unobjectionable, or nearly 
unobjectionable, to most scholars of the criminal law. This portion of 
the Article does not mean to court controversy, and it defends pardons 
on the narrowest of grounds: pardons can be necessary to secure justice 
in particular cases—not as grand acts of mercy but in many cases as 
matters of individual right.  
But in finding that pardons may be arbitrarily distributed, this Article 
opens a new avenue for challenging pardons, one that has been largely 
underdeveloped in legal literature: as violations of fair or equal 
treatment.26 Even when we have considered an executive’s pardons one 
by one, there is still another level on which we can evaluate them: were 
the pardons just considered as a whole? Justice, this Article maintains, 
has to be considered both at the retail and at the wholesale level.   
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I examines a prominent 
theory of the pardoning power advanced by Kathleen Moore.27 Moore 
defends a narrow view which sees pardons as justified only when they 
are necessary to correct an injustice in the administration of the criminal 
law. Part I also shows, surprisingly, that many if not all of Haley 
Barbour’s pardons may have been justified under Moore’s theory.  
Part II examines the possibility that even though many of Barbour’s 
pardons might be justifiable individually, there may be something 
wrong with his pardons taken as a whole. Moore supports pardons as 
justifiable when done to correct an injustice in an individual case, given 
that our criminal justice system is flawed. But Haley Barbour’s pardons 
show that even pardons that correct individual injustices in the status 
quo may still be, on another level, unjustified. This happens when 
pardons are done in the wrong way, including when they are distributed 
in a morally discriminatory or morally arbitrary manner.28 Part II 
examines whether this is the case with Haley Barbour’s pardons and 
with pardons in the second Bush administration. 
                                                                                                                     
 26. Some have dealt with the problem of biased pardons, although they take a slightly 
different focus than I do. See generally Elizabeth Rapaport, Staying Alive: Executive Clemency, 
Equal Protection, and the Politics of Gender in Women’s Capital Cases, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 
967 (2001) (suggesting a possible positive role for biased pardons, based on a theory of 
“exemplary” pardons); Mark Strasser, The Limits of the Clemency Power on Pardons, 
Retributivists, and the United States Constitution, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 85, 117–23 (2003) 
(discussing possible Constitutional constraints on pardons based on gender or race).  
 27. See generally MOORE, supra note 13; Kathleen Dean Moore, Pardon for Good and 
Sufficient Reasons, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 281 (1993) [hereinafter Moore, Pardon for Good and 
Sufficient Reasons]. 
 28. This has obvious implications for the debate on “comparative desert.” See, e.g., Ronen 
Avraham & Daniel Statman, More on the Comparative Nature of Desert: Can a Deserved 
Punishment Be Unjust? 3 (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper 
Series No. 243, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=2146749.  
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Part III extends the analysis of Barbour’s pardons into a larger point 
about reforming the criminal justice system in nonideal circumstances. 
There are constraints on giving pardons that go beyond basing them on 
good and sufficient reasons. These constraints focus on how reform in 
the criminal justice system ought to happen. Even when we pursue just 
ends, such as when we pardon those who have been sentenced unjustly, 
we must pursue them within some limits—that is, even if we should 
pardon more, there are better and worse ways of pardoning many 
people.  
This Article uses Barbour’s pardons as examples of a problem with 
dispensing pardons on arbitrary or immoral grounds, where the pardons 
on a case-by-case basis may be justified, but when taken as a whole, a 
troubling pattern emerges. Recent research into the use of presidential 
pardons shows that they also have been granted on an arbitrary or 
possibly discriminatory basis.29 So the problem is not an isolated one, 
reserved to a particular governor of a particular state. It shows a danger 
in the pardon power in general and underscores the pressing need to 
develop more elaborate standards for the proper use of the pardon.30  
I.  A DEFENSE OF THE PARDONING POWER 
The pardon power has long been controversial in itself, and not only 
because of the controversy surrounding instances of the power's use.31 
This part illustrates Karen Moore’s influential explanation of when 
pardons are justified. Moore defends pardons narrowly, as necessary to 
correct serious injustices in the legal system. Moore’s view of the 
pardon power is strict, and on some accounts might not amount to a 
theory of executive “mercy” at all, if by “mercy” we mean judgments 
based on whim or caprice or compassion rather than specific 
reasoning.32 This may well be an advantage of Moore’s account, 
                                                                                                                     
 29. See especially the excellent e-book produced by ProPublica, DAFNA LINZER & 
JENNIFER LAFLEUR, PRESIDENTIAL PARDONS: SHADES OF MERCY (2012). See also Editorial, The 
Quality of Mercy, Strained, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/06/ 
opinion/sunday/the-quality-of-mercy-strained.html?_r=0 (discussing the possible racial bias in 
presidential pardons). 
 30. Regarding the recent pardoning controversy in South Korea, see Choe Sang-Hun, 
Departing South Korean Leader Creates Furor with Pardons, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/30/world/asia/outgoing-south-korean-leader-creates-furor-wit 
h-pardons.html (“With less than one month left in office, the departing president of South 
Korea, Lee Myung-bak, granted special pardons on Tuesday to political allies, a longtime friend 
and dozens of others who have been convicted of corruption and other crimes.”). 
 31. See generally Markel, supra note 13. 
 32. See id. at 1436 (“Mercy I define first as the remission of deserved punishment, in part 
or in whole, to criminal offenders on the basis of characteristics that evoke compassion or 
sympathy but that are morally unrelated to the offender’s competence and ability to choose to 
engage in criminal conduct.”). Markel would more likely categorize Moore’s defense of pardons 
as a defense of “equitable discretion.” Id. at 1440. For more on the distinction between 
8
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because it can help us to separate acts of pardoning from acts of mercy. 
Not all acts of pardoning are acts of mercy, and some acts of pardoning 
might be morally obligatory.  
Moore defends pardoning, then, but not as an unfettered right of the 
executive to forgive crimes or as a gift that falls on those the sovereign 
happens to favor (the traditional view which was arguably in the 
background of the Mississippi Supreme Court’s ruling upholding 
Barbour’s pardons).33 For Moore, an executive cannot just pardon for 
any reason or for no reason at all. Rather, the executive must pardon 
only for “good and sufficient reasons” relating to the offender’s 
culpability and to the proportionality of the offender’s punishment. A 
pardon, in other words, cannot be given simply because the executive 
wants to give it.34 It has to be justified morally. 
While we might think that Barbour’s pardons could only be 
defended on the traditional view (under which the sovereign has an 
absolute right to pardon), this part argues that Barbour’s pardons might 
also be defended under Moore’s view. For it could turn out that Barbour 
had, in Moore’s terms, “good and sufficient reasons” to pardon each 
offender: one offender’s sentence might have been too harsh, for 
instance, or another offender might have been wrongly convicted. To 
see whether the pardons were justified, we would need to examine each 
case separately on its own merits.  
A.  Moore’s Theory of Pardons 
Moore defends the pardoning power as an extension of retributive 
justice,35 but adopting her theory does not require adopting retributivism 
tout court.36 Retributive justice, in her view, punishes offenders because 
they deserve it. In an imperfect system of criminal justice, offenders 
may not always get what they morally or legally deserve, and so need to 
                                                                                                                     
pardoning and mercy, see infra Section I.B.  
 33. The Mississippi Supreme Court’s ruling was made on narrow, separation of powers 
grounds, but the idea that the executive’s decision was unreviewable by any other branch 
certainly suggests a power that is accountable to no other body. One of the dissenters was more 
explicit about the roots of the pardon power. See In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d 401, 440 (Miss. 2012) 
(Pierce, J., dissenting) (“[T]he power to pardon . . . is an act of the sovereign’s ‘mercy and 
grace.’” (quoting Whittington v. Stevens, 98 So. 111, 114 (Miss. 1923))); see also Moore, 
Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, supra note 27, at 282 (“The pardoning power of the 
great monarchs of seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe was analogous in theory and 
practice to divine grace. Like grace, the freely given, unearned gift of divine favor, a royal 
pardon was thought of as a personal gift. Therefore, it required no justification and was not 
subject to criticism.”). 
 34. Moore, supra note 27, at 283. 
 35. See generally MOORE, supra note 13, at 87–178 (“A Retributivist Theory of 
Pardons”).  
 36. See infra note 44. 
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be pardoned, either by being released or by having their sentences 
reduced. As Moore writes, “A pardon is justified when the procedures 
miscarry, giving the state a legal, but not a moral, license to punish.”37  
What exactly Moore means by “procedures miscarry” is ambiguous, 
and could mean at least two things. She could first mean that 
somewhere in the process a legal mistake has been made. This could 
happen when, say, a judge misapplies the sentencing guidelines and 
gives a longer than authorized sentence, or instructs the jury incorrectly, 
leading to a conviction. These legal mistakes are presumably ones that 
could be corrected by an appellate court, but could also be the basis for 
an executive pardon for “good and sufficient reasons.” If the law were 
followed correctly, the state may have had the right to punish as it did, 
but the law wasn’t followed, so it doesn’t have that right. A pardon can 
correct the failure of actors within the legal system to live up to the 
legal system’s own commands. 
But there is another, deeper way in which procedures can miscarry. 
A legal process, even when it is followed correctly, can lead to a 
morally wrong result. For example, an innocent person may be 
convicted even though all the proper legal procedures have been 
followed—no actor in the legal system has made a legal mistake. When 
something like this happens, there may be no legal error we can directly 
or obviously identify.38 What this leaves us with is a moral error that 
needs correcting.  
Suppose, for instance, that the evidence that exists at the time of a 
trial leads a reasonable jury to convict someone of a crime.39 Every 
appellate court subsequently upholds the conviction. Nonetheless, many 
years after the trial, new evidence comes to light that clearly exculpates 
the convicted person. Here the procedures have nonetheless miscarried, 
not because they were not followed (they were), but because they led to 
the wrong result. From a point of view external to those legal 
procedures, we can see that something has gone wrong, even though in 
a strictly legal sense, nothing has.40 In cases like these, a pardon can be 
justified, because the reason for the legal procedures (ideally) is to 
protect the innocent. To prevent a morally innocent person from being 
punished is a “good and sufficient reason” to pardon, says Moore.41  
More controversially, suppose that a sentence handed down, while 
                                                                                                                     
 37. Moore, Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, supra note 27, at 286 (emphasis 
added). 
 38. See Baude, supra note 15, at 19.  
 39. I borrow this example from Moore, Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, supra 
note 27, at 286. 
 40. As a result, we can imagine a theory of pardons that justifies them only in cases of 
strict legal error (the rules have not been followed correctly), but not in cases of moral error 
(where the procedures have been followed, but the result is morally wrong). 
 41. Moore, Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, supra note 27, at 287.  
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perfectly legal, is nonetheless, by some recognizable moral standard, 
too harsh or unfair.42 If this is the case, although the state may legally 
punish that person a certain term of years, the state has no moral right to 
do so. That person may have his sentence permissibly reduced by an act 
of executive mercy, according to Moore.43 How to decide when a 
sentence is too harsh is a complicated question, which Moore does not 
attempt to answer, nor will this Article.44 But we might intuitively agree 
that some sentences, in principle, might be too harsh for an offender 
given his crime, or given other factors. In those cases, the executive has 
a “good and sufficient reason” to reduce the sentence, or to end it 
altogether. 
In general, for Moore, “pardons should be used as part of a broader 
constitutional scheme to ensure that sentences are assigned justly.”45 
This can happen when the legal procedures miscarry in an obvious way 
(the judge who has misapplied sentencing guidelines), or in a less 
obvious way: when the punishment is not consistent with the values that 
underlie the criminal justice system as a whole, such as protecting 
innocence, or of assigning punishment that is proportional to the 
offense.46 A legalistic pardon, then, would be one that corrected a legal 
failing in the relevant procedures: to fix a legal mistake that somewhere 
along the line has been made but has not yet been rectified. A moralistic 
pardon does something different—it corrects a moral error that has 
occurred even though the legal procedures have been followed 
correctly. A moralistic pardon looks at the procedures and announces, in 
light of the spirit of the legal system (but not its letter) that a mistake 
                                                                                                                     
 42. George W. Bush’s pardon of Scooter Libby was arguably of this sort. One 
commentator noted:  
 
Presidents have also commuted sentences they feel are too harsh without 
removing the taint of the conviction. President George W. Bush did just that 
when he commuted the sentence of Scooter Libby, Dick Cheney’s former chief 
of staff. “I respect the jury’s verdict,” Bush said at the time. “But I have 
concluded that the prison sentence given to Mr. Libby is excessive. Therefore, I 
am commuting the portion of Mr. Libby’s sentence that required him to spend 30 
months in prison. 
 
Michael A. Lindenberger, The Quality of Mercy: Don’t Jump on Haley Barbour All at Once, 
TIME (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2104577,00.html. 
 43. Moore, Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, supra note 27, at 287. 
 44. Moore defines harshness in retributive terms, as being a sentence that exceeds the 
offender’s desert. MOORE, supra note 13, at 98. But one could also imagine it being defined in 
other theoretical terms: a harsh sentence could be one that no longer had any utilitarian point (it 
didn’t deter other offenders, or rehabilitate the offender), or that caused too much suffering. On 
this last point, see the illuminating remarks in David Gray, Punishment as Suffering, 63 VAND. 
L. REV. 1619, 1691–93 (2010).  
 45. Moore, Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, supra note 27, at 286. 
 46.  Markel also makes a similar point. Markel, supra note 13.  
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has been made and fixes it. In sum: a legalistic pardon upholds the rules 
of the system that for whatever reason weren’t followed in the earlier 
proceedings; a moralistic pardon upholds the values of the system 
that—again, for whatever reason—the rules of the system didn’t track.   
B.  An Objection Briefly Considered 
This, again, is not the place to present a fully vetted theory of 
pardons; this Article borrows Moore’s theory, for the most part, to test 
whether even if pardons taken individually might be for good and 
sufficient reasons, they might be unjust when taken as a whole. This 
will be this Article’s main contribution to the debate over pardons, and 
this Article pursues this contribution in Part II. But first, considering an 
objection to Moore’s theory may help flesh it out a bit. 
Some might object that Moore’s theory is not really a theory of 
pardons at all. A theory of pardons, the objection goes, should specify 
those places where the executive can permissibly exercise mercy. But 
the above cases show no such thing; rather, they show cases where the 
executive must act, so that he or she is morally required to stop the 
injustice. Moore’s theory of pardons makes pardons mandatory and not 
permissible.47 
But it is not truly an objection to Moore’s theory to note that it 
diagnoses at least some acts of pardon as morally mandatory. Indeed, 
there are certain cases in which presidents or governors are morally 
required to prevent a grave injustice. It would be a flaw in a theory if it 
could not identify these instances. A pardon that a governor is morally 
required to give—say of a person who is actually innocent of his 
crime—is not any less a pardon for that. 
We might worry, still, that on Moore’s theory, there are only 
mandatory pardons, that there is no place for discretion on whom or 
when to pardon. Even if this is so, this may not be a decisive objection 
to its classification as a theory of pardons (in short, I do not think that 
pardons must contain only permissible acts).48 But there is still 
                                                                                                                     
 47. Antony Duff makes a version of this point in his review of Moore’s book. See R.A. 
Duff, Review Essay/Justice, Mercy, and Forgiveness, 9 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 51, 61 (1990) 
(arguing that, in some cases, Moore’s theory renders pardons “necessary or obligatory, not 
merely permissible”).  
 48. This may be the place to again emphasize that I am interested in pardoning, not in 
mercy. Mercy may necessarily be a discretionary act, tied to any reason or no reason at all, and 
be something that “someone has neither a natural nor a legal right to claim—it is bestowed upon 
the offender—perhaps like some understandings of grace.” Markel, supra note 13, at 1437. This 
may be true of mercy, but it does not seem to me to be true of pardons. In some cases, a person 
may have a right to a pardon (because, for example, she is innocent, and cannot achieve 
vindication in any other way but an executive pardon). For a similar distinction (between mercy 
and equity), see Stephen P. Garvey, Is It Wrong to Commute Death Row? Retribution, 
Atonement, and Mercy, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1319, 1325–30 (2004).  
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something to say to this. First, exactly what punishment an offender 
deserves will usually be controversial. Does every offender who 
commits a wrong deserve to be arrested, to be prosecuted, to be given 
this sentence and no other? Always? There are no definitive answers to 
these questions.49 When an executive decides that a person’s sentence is 
more than he deserves, the executive is acting with some discretion, in 
the same way that many other actors in the criminal justice system have 
acted with discretion. When the executive makes this decision, he may 
not be morally obligated to act in a certain way (to pardon or not to 
pardon); there may simply be ambiguity as to what the offender 
deserves in this case. 
Indeed, the executive has a certain advantage in the process because 
she comes at a later stage: she can see how the offender has responded 
to the punishment, whether conditions have changed so that the offender 
no longer deserves the original punishment, or whether the offender has 
reformed herself.50 No matter which overarching theory of punishment 
we adopt, the executive has more information about whether those 
purposes are being accomplished in a fair way.51 The governor, say, can 
see if the punishment is still useful, just, or deserved. There is still 
enormous room for judgment here; as stated, there is no clear answer to 
the question of who deserves clemency and who does not. So even on 
Moore’s theory, there is room for saying that some pardons are 
permissible and some are mandatory.  
C.  Justifying Haley Barbour’s Pardons 
Moore’s theory of pardons in the end is relatively unambitious. It 
does not rely (or need to rely) on a theory of mercy or even (as I have 
presented it) on any particular theory of punishment. What it says is 
fairly simple. If there are flawed moral or legal judgments in the 
criminal justice system, a pardon is one way that those judgments can 
be corrected, and corrected in the name of the rules and values of the 
legal system itself. But can such a narrow view justify Haley Barbour’s 
pardons, or does it instead show why the pardons may be illegitimate? 
                                                                                                                     
 49. I make this point about the indeterminacy of desert at length in another paper, Chad 
Flanders, The Limits of Retribution, 2014 B.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 23–
24). Also see the excellent paper by Alice Ristroph on the same point, Alice Ristroph, Desert, 
Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1293 (2006). 
 50. See Elizabeth Rapaport, Retribution and Redemption in the Operation of Executive 
Clemency, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1501, 1533 (2000). 
 51. Even on a retributive theory, it seems incorrect to say that we can learn nothing about 
an offender’s act after he had committed it: we may learn about his culpability, or his character, 
only later. The idea that we have perfect knowledge of an offender’s competence or ability to 
choose to commit a crime at the time of trial seems to be a mistake. Of course, new exculpatory 
evidence can be discovered after a trial is concluded, which would also give obvious grounds, 
on retributive theory, for changing or removing the sentence.  
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The answer to this question is rather straightforward on Moore’s 
view, although perhaps in other respects unsatisfying: we can only tell if 
we look at the pardons one at a time, and see if they are supported by 
“good and sufficient reasons,” in Moore’s phrase.52 If some sentences 
were incorrectly imposed, then Barbour was right to pardon those who 
received those sentences. If some other legal, procedural rule were not 
followed, then that case too would be eligible for a pardon. In short, the 
analysis under Moore’s theory is individualistic, rather than holistic.53 
We do not have to look to any other pardon to see whether a pardon in 
an individual case was justified.  
It is unlikely that there were many such “legalistic” pardons granted 
by Barbour; indeed if there were any at all, Barbour would have wanted 
to draw attention to these pardons. More probable is that Barbour gave 
many “moralistic” pardons. Barbour may have rightly believed that 
some offenders had suffered enough from their punishments or faced 
collateral consequences from their punishments that were no longer 
warranted (if they ever were). Certainly this could have been the case 
for those who were given early release for medical reasons (although 
Barbour’s office defended these pardons, rather cynically, in terms of 
saving the state money).54  
In particular, Barbour may have felt that some offenders had been 
given too long of a sentence, even if the offenders were properly 
sentenced under the criminal code of Mississippi. For example, the 
summer before his departure from office, Barbour commuted the 
sentences of two African-American women who were sentenced to life 
for an armed robbery that netted a total of eleven dollars.55 In the case 
of Earnest Scott Favre (the brother of Brett Favre), Favre was originally 
sentenced to one-year house arrest for his crime, but had that increased 
                                                                                                                     
 52. Some of the early news reports covering Barbour’s pardons conceded this.  
 53. For a related, but more technical, use of these terms, see generally THOMAS HURKA, 
Desert: Individualistic and Holistic, in DRAWING MORALS: ESSAYS IN ETHICAL THEORY 154 
(2011) (distinguishing between desert in an individual case and desert across cases, and calling 
the latter way of looking at desert “holistic”).  
 54. Barbour Issues Statement on Clemency, NESHOBA DEMOCRAT (Jan. 11, 2012, 7:10 
PM), http://neshobademocrat.com/main.asp?FromHome=1&TypeID=1&ArticleID=25005 
&SectionID=63&SubSectionID=493 (“Half of the people who were incarcerated and released 
were placed on indefinite suspension due to medical reasons because their health care expenses 
while incarcerated were costing the state so much money. These individuals suffer from severe 
chronic illnesses, are on dialysis, in wheelchairs or are bedridden.”). Barbour’s office did go on 
to say that these people no longer represented threats to society.  
 55. Patrik Jonsson, Did Haley Barbour’s Pardon Spree Go Too Far?, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2012/0111/Did-Haley-Barbour-s-
pardon-spree-go-too-far (“Last summer, Barbour was hailed by the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People as a ‘shining example’ for commuting the life sentences of two 
African-American women who had spent 16 years in prison for an armed robbery that yielded 
$11.”).  
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to a suspended fifteen-year sentence “after he left his house to go 
fishing.”56 In these three cases, Barbour probably thought that the 
resulting sentences were too harsh, and so a pardon was warranted.57  
More compelling still, Barbour may have believed that some 
suffered from the stigma of their criminal conviction, and that this was 
too much: they had, in his view, suffered enough from their crimes. 
They deserved the right to be able to apply for a job without the burden 
of a past felony conviction, or to reclaim their right to vote, or to hunt.58 
Indeed Barbour’s office made this last point explicit in his remarks 
defending his pardons.59 Especially if we believe such things as felony 
disenfranchisement are per se unjust and immoral punishments,60 a 
pardon designed to negate this feature of Mississippi sentences would 
seem to be one that is done for good and sufficient reasons.  
In short, it is hard to argue against the supposition that at least some 
of Barbour’s pardons were justified under Moore’s analysis. Probably at 
least some of the sentences were cases where the state had a narrow 
legal right to punish, but the punishments were in fact morally 
unjustified. Barbour, on Moore’s view, had the power to pardon in these 
cases. Some of the cases, though, were probably not cases of pardons 
for good and sufficient reasons: they were based on ties of friendship, or 
because of lobbying, or for some other non-morally salient reason. They 
could not be based on good and sufficient reasons.  
Suppose then (even if counterfactually) that all of Barbour’s pardons 
were done for good and sufficient reasons. We would have to tell a long 
and detailed story about how this was so. We would have to say which 
punishments were too long, or who (if anyone) was wrongly convicted. 
We might have to tell a story about how some punishments, such as the 
taking away the right to vote for convicted felons, are never permissible, 
so that removing those punishments via an act of clemency would be 
justified. If we could tell a story that gave a good and sufficient reason 
                                                                                                                     
 56. Id.  
 57. At the same time, it could be argued that Favre’s original sentence was too lenient, 
and that the later, longer sentence fixed this. 
 58. On this score, see Molly M. Gill, Op-Ed., Why Did Governor Haley Barbour’s 
Pardons Cause Such a Backlash?, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 19, 2012, 5:29 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/molly-m-gill/haley-barbour-pardons_b_1217237.html (“What is 
it about former Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour’s pardons that irk us so much? It can’t be 
because 189 people who were already out of prison and obeying the law will have better job 
prospects and restored civil rights because he pardoned them.”). 
 59. “The pardons were intended to allow them to find gainful employment or acquire 
professional licenses as well as hunt and vote.” Barbour Issues Statement on Clemency, supra 
note 54. 
 60. See generally Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, 
Representation, and the Debate over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147 (2004) 
(discussing the constitutionality and morality of laws disenfranchising felons).  
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for each of Barbour’s pardons (assuming we could), then there would be 
no objection to them, at least on Moore’s view. 
But I want to register a sense of uneasiness about this conclusion, a 
sense that goes beyond the suspicion that not all of Barbour’s pardons 
could be individually justified. In what follows, this Article argues that, 
even if all of the pardons were granted for good and sufficient reasons, 
there can be problems with a governor’s pardons taken as a whole. That 
is, we have to analyze the justifiability of pardons on two levels: first, 
on the level of the individual pardon; and second, on the level of all the 
pardons granted by an executive. There can be objections to the 
pardoning power that appear only, or at least most clearly, on the 
wholesale level. Part II considers these objections. 
II.  PROBLEMS WITH PARDONS EN MASSE 
The general thrust of Moore’s view on pardons is this: there can be 
flaws in the system of criminal justice that lead to results that are not 
consistent with the underlying (for Moore, retributive) values of the 
criminal justice system itself.61 If an executive pardons to correct those 
flaws, his pardon is justified. As we saw in the last part, this means that 
there seems to be in principle no reason why all of Barbour’s pardons 
might not have been justified, as a means of correcting morally flawed 
sentences. To see whether this was true, we would have to look at each 
pardon individually. 
This part raises some doubts about the moral sufficiency of this 
approach—for there may be groups of pardons, all of which could be 
justified individually, but which might still be morally wrong taken 
together. This part first provides cases where a group of pardons 
intuitively raise some moral questions. After each case, this part 
explains why these moral questions might render some pardons as a 
whole unjustified, or at the very least problematic. Part II concludes by 
showing that Barbour’s pardons could be morally questionable in 
precisely these ways. 
A.  Some Problematic Pardons 
1.  Racist Pardons 
A governor in a southern state decides to commute62 the sentences of 
four murderers on death row to life in prison without the possibility of 
                                                                                                                     
 61. Dan Markel makes a related argument about the values of the criminal justice system 
and of liberal democracy in justifying certain exercises of clemency. See generally Dan Markel, 
State, Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the Commutation of Death Row and the 
Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 407 (2005).  
 62. This Article will sometimes refer to these commutations as “pardons,” just for ease of 
reference. But technically, they are commutations, not pardons. 
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parole. He does this, he says, because he believes that the death penalty 
is deeply immoral and inconsistent with the rule of law; and let us 
suppose, just for the sake of argument, that he is right about this.63 The 
death penalty is an unjustified and unjustifiable act of punishment, and 
so anytime the state does it, the state is deeply in the wrong. On 
Moore’s account, pardons for those on death row would be pardons for 
good and sufficient reasons, because preventing some from being given 
a deeply immoral punishment is (if anything is) a permissible reason for 
a pardon. 
But there is a catch. There are eight other people on the state’s death 
row who the governor has decided not to pardon. He makes a vague 
promise that he will pardon the others later, when it is politically 
feasible, but he is at the end of his term, and his announcement of the 
four pardons has engendered considerable controversy. He will most 
likely not pardon the others.  
Moreover (and this is the deeper problem), it turns out that the four 
he has decided to remove from death row are all of the same color. They 
are white, and the remaining non-pardoned death row inmates are black. 
Indeed, this seems to be the only obvious difference between those the 
governor has pardoned and those he has not; no meaningful distinction 
can be manufactured from the different crimes the convicted murderers 
have committed; all were grisly and gruesome, and all offenders were 
convicted at roughly the same time. The governor mumbles something 
about having no awareness of the race of those whom he pardoned (“I 
just saw names”).64 But the fact is, the governor’s pardons were at best 
selective and at worst racially motivated.  
Here we have a case where the four pardons taken individually are 
done for good and sufficient reasons. Each white person pardoned is 
pardoned because his sentence of death was (we are supposing for the 
sake of argument) immoral. But the problem is that the pardons were 
                                                                                                                     
 63. The hypothetical case here bears some resemblance to Governor George Ryan’s 
commutation of death sentences in Illinois, which has been much discussed in the legal 
literature. See Markel, supra note 61 and sources cited therein. I should be clear, however, that 
nothing hangs on the particular example; indeed, I have my doubts that the death penalty is in 
fact per se immoral. See my paper, Chad Flanders, The Case Against the Case Against the 
Death Penalty, 17 NEW CRIM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).  
 64. This was, in fact, a justification offered for the color blindness of Barbour’s pardons—
that race was not listed on the application for pardon. One news report stated:  
“A majority of the clemency cases were reviewed by the Parole Board 
before being sent to Governor Barbour,” Barbour spokesperson Laura Hipp 
told Reuters, which conducted an analysis of Barbour’s pardons. “Race was not 
a factor in his decision. In fact, it wasn’t even listed on the Parole Board’s 
application.” 
See Jonsson, supra note 8. 
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not comprehensive or consistent; or rather, if they were consistent, they 
were consistent on the basis of race. The governor did not pardon all of 
those who he had a good and sufficient reason to pardon. 
Does this render the pardons illegitimate? There is a strong case that 
it would. The pardons while justified individually are on the whole 
distributed in a racially unfair way (ignoring for now whether it matters 
if this was done intentionally or accidentally). So there is a norm that 
may govern the granting of pardons that appears only on the level of 
pardoning en masse, which we can call an antidiscrimination norm.65 
Pardons that are distributed in a racially discriminatory manner would 
seem to be morally objectionable, even if the pardons considered 
individually are justified by good and sufficient reasons. How we 
understand the force of this norm is open to debate,66 but something like 
that norm exists and underlies our intuitive reaction to the “all white” 
pardons scenario. 
2.  Pardoning “Favorites” 
Suppose we make this one small change to the hypothetical: the 
people the governor pardons are not all of the same race, but they share 
something else in common: (1) they are friends of friends of the 
governor, (2) they have hired professional lobbyists to make their case 
to the governor, (3) they are veterans of the governor’s “trusty” 
program,67 or (4) they or their relatives are high-profile donors to the 
governor’s campaign.68 So, on this hypothetical, instead of pardons that 
are based on race (or that happen to be given to members of the same 
race), we have selective pardons to those with connections of some sort 
                                                                                                                     
 65. Although it would seem intuitively different if the governor had announced that the 
four black members of death row were to be pardoned, but not the eight white members. This 
shows that the norm operating might be anti-caste, and not purely antidiscrimination. For a 
discussion of the anti-caste principle, see Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection 
Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 162 (1976). 
 66. We might wonder, for example, whether the norm is specifically an anti-racism norm, 
or one more tied to nonarbitrariness or respect more generally.  
 67. See supra note 5 and sources cited (explaining the trusty program). 
 68. Again, this seems to have been the case with many of Barbour’s pardons: 
 Yet in a state with the highest poverty rate in the nation, where nearly 70 
percent of convicts are black, official redemption appears to have been attained 
disproportionately by white people and the well connected.  
. . . . 
 Mississippi’s pardon system, like those in other states, rewards applicants 
who have both the financial means and the connections to seek reprieves 
aggressively.  
Robertson & Saul, supra note 6. 
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or another to the governor. Again, let us say that there are four people 
(out of twelve) who get pardoned, and all of them have this relevant 
feature. Once more, we are assuming that the death penalty is an 
immoral punishment, so those four who are pardoned have a good and 
sufficient reason to be pardoned. 
These pardons are nonetheless morally problematic for a similar, 
though not identical, reason to the pardons based on race: the pardons 
pick out a non-morally salient characteristic (closeness to the governor) 
as a basis for distinguishing between like offenders. Here the 
characteristic is possibly not as bad as race (given the fraught history of 
race relations in America, and especially in the South), and may be less 
invidious than choosing on the basis of race. But it still seems wrong to 
show favoritism to those lucky enough to be friends of friends of the 
governor, or who have the money to hire a lawyer to lobby the 
governor. It is wrong and unjust to show favoritism in pardoning, even 
though the pardons taken individually have good and sufficient reasons 
to support them. Call this norm against selective pardoning the anti-
favoritism norm.  
3.  Random Pardons 
Take many of the same facts from the two previous hypotheticals: a 
governor decides to pardon some, but not all, of those on death row, 
because it would be too politically unpopular to commute all of their 
sentences. But this time she does not choose on the basis of race or 
family (or happens to distribute her mercy only to those of a particular 
race or with family ties); rather, she decides to hold a lottery, 
commuting the sentences of the four who win the lottery. Again, let us 
suppose that the death penalty is a deeply immoral punishment, and the 
state is never justified in imposing it on anyone. So a commutation of a 
person’s death sentence is always justified, for preventing someone 
from suffering an immoral punishment is always a good and sufficient 
reason. For each person on death row who wins the lottery, 
consequently, there was a good and sufficient reason to have his 
sentence commuted.69  
Does it make better sense that the selective outcome of the lottery is 
random, rather than based on the racist or otherwise biased choices of 
the governor? It may make the pardons more acceptable, but still not 
fully acceptable all things considered. For while the norms against racial 
discrimination or favoritism are not violated, another norm is violated: 
the norm against unequal treatment. The governor is not treating like 
                                                                                                                     
 69. A similar example is introduced in Markel, supra note 13, at 1464, but for different 
purposes. The classic thought experiment of chance and the criminal law is advanced by David 
Lewis, The Punishment That Leaves Something to Chance, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 53 (1989).  
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cases alike; instead she is just choosing arbitrarily, based on nothing 
more than a random lottery. Those who do not win the lottery can 
complain that they have been unfairly treated, because there is nothing 
that makes their case different than those who have won.  
Or can they? I confess to feeling more ambivalent about this case, an 
ambivalence that was absent in the previous, race-based and favorite-
based cases. Those who win the lottery have not benefitted from racial 
discrimination or from family ties. Instead, those who win the lottery 
get a gift, one that those who lose the lottery do not: and each had an 
equal shot at getting the gift. Is the implication of the norm against 
arbitrary treatment that unless all get the pardon, no one can? Do gifts 
have to be distributed equally, or not at all? 
In the case of pardoning, we may worry about a further implication 
that randomness suggests—for what the lottery system resembles is 
nothing so much as the old version of the sovereign’s right to pardon in 
which the sovereign can decide how to pardon (for any reason, or for no 
reason at all) just because he is the sovereign.70 This seems inconsistent 
with a system that asks its officials, at all levels, to act according to 
rule-of-law values like consistency and uniformity. So although this is a 
closer case, pardons that are arbitrarily granted are problematic, even if 
those pardons taken one by one, can be justified by good and sufficient 
reasons.71 Such pardons violate the norm against arbitrary treatment.72  
                                                                                                                     
 70. The ability of the sovereign to pardon only those he or she favored (on whatever 
grounds) would also be an example of this. See Sang-Hun, supra note 30 (describing the pardon 
power as the exercise of the sovereign’s power). 
 71. Avraham and Statman argue that the race case differs from the random case, because 
in the race case one has been disrespected, but not when one has been randomly favored or 
disfavored. But my intuitions differ here: why isn’t it a matter of disrespect to decide desert 
questions on the basis of a lottery? Why wouldn’t this, as well, show a disrespectful attitude 
towards the offender’s fate? Wouldn’t it also suggest a possible trifling attitude towards 
questions of desert and justice? Avraham & Statman, supra note 28, at 8. 
 72. It is important to note that not all selective pardons are arbitrary. A favoritist method 
of selection and a random method of selection may be objectionable, but not a method that, say, 
selects whom to pardon based on the fact that some of those on death row committed less 
gruesome crimes than others, or that some convicts were more reformed. One has commentator 
has observed: 
 
For example, though we may acknowledge the impossibility of ticketing all 
speeding drivers and still favor ticketing some, we will not find every way of 
determining which speeders are ticketed equally just. Consider the policy of 
ticketing only those who travel at extremely high speeds, as opposed to that of 
ticketing every tenth car. Compare these with the policy of giving tickets only to 
speeders with beards and long hair or to speeders whose cars bear bumper 
stickers expressing unpopular political views. While I shall not pursue this point 
in detail, I take it to be obvious that these different selection policies are not all 
equally just or acceptable. 
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This principle requires qualification, though. For it seems that here, 
more than in the previous cases, we might want to weigh more heavily 
the wrongness of the underlying punishment: in this case, an immoral 
and unjust execution. It may be that that wrongness would be sufficient 
to outweigh the wrong done by a random pardon (however we might 
specify that wrong). This may suggest that we are always doing an 
implicit balancing between the harm of the wrong (i.e., unjust, harsh) 
punishment and the harm done by a racist, biased, or random pardon. It 
was only in the cases of racism and favoritism that it seemed clearer that 
those wrongs were worse than the wrong of the unfair punishments (or 
at least the unfair punishments of those who were lucky enough to be 
pardoned). Our calculation could be more complicated still if it were a 
question of arbitrarily pardoning some who had been wrongly convicted 
or not pardoning any.  
4.  Pardons for the Wrong Reasons 
Now consider a final twist on the above example. Let us suppose 
that the governor now commutes the sentences of all twelve members of 
death row. There is no question of unfair or arbitrary treatment of any of 
them; they all get their sentences commuted and no one is excluded for 
any reason. But there is again a catch. The reason, this time, that the 
governor pardons all of them, is that they are (similar to the case of 
favoritist pardons) friends of friends. He cannot get them out of prison 
altogether (that would be politically infeasible), but he can prevent them 
from being executed. 
The death penalty is still, as we have been suggesting for the sake of 
argument, a deeply immoral penalty, so that it is never justified that 
someone be put to death for a crime they have committed. So the 
pardons are in fact consistent with good and sufficient reasons for 
mercy, because it is a good and sufficient reason to prevent someone 
from receiving an immoral punishment.  
But this, of course, is not the reason the governor gives for 
commuting the sentences. He says he is commuting their sentences 
because it is traditional to pardon members of the “trusty” program.73 
                                                                                                                     
Stephen Nathanson, Does It Matter If the Death Penalty Is Arbitrarily Administered?, 14 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 149, 153 (1985). Selective pardons made for efficiency reasons too could be 
justified—indeed, even if a lottery were used to make the choices. This is a point that deserves 
much more investigation, for it deals with what are permissible means of selectively pardoning. 
But that is for another paper: here I am interested in impermissible means. Thanks to John Inazu 
for pressing me on this point.  
 73. Barbour, supra note 11 (“This was not a new thing. For decades, Mississippi 
governors have granted clemency to the inmates who work at the mansion. I followed that 
tradition four years ago and did so again at the end of my second term. No one should have been 
surprised.”). Barbour’s past pardons of trusties were no less controversial. See Bob Herbert, The 
Mississippi Pardons, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/16/opinion/ 
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Or it could even be that the governor says he’s pardoning the inmates 
for good and sufficient reasons (the immorality of the death penalty), 
but his real reason is because of the personal connections he has with 
the inmates. Moreover, unlike the previous three cases, the governor has 
pardoned all twelve of the death row inmates, so his treatment of them 
is not in any way “selective.” To use Immanuel Kant’s helpful 
terminology, the governor in this case is pardoning according to duty, 
but he is not pardoning from the motive of duty.74 His pardons happen to 
be coextensive with the pardons he ought to be giving.  
Is there anything wrong with the pardons in this case? I think so, 
because the professed reasons the governor gives don’t match up with 
the proper reasons, and the professed reasons are not, in fact, good and 
sufficient reasons for pardoning. To put it another way, there is a 
disconnect between what would justify the commutations, and what in 
fact justified them for the governor. What justified the pardons for the 
governor was that the people who had their sentences commuted had a 
personal connection to him. But (we are supposing) it turns out that 
those who had a personal connection with him also were justified in 
having their sentences commuted. 
Still, it was in some sense a matter of sheer chance that those who 
are no longer on death row in fact should not have been on death row in 
the first place. They got off ultimately because of their connection to the 
governor (and the governor’s subsequent favoritism), not for the good 
and sufficient reasons that were available to justify their 
commutations.75 It just happens that all twelve had this characteristic 
this time, rather than just four of them.  
So in short, we’ve eliminated the selectivity of the pardons, but 
reintroduced another problem related to but not quite the same as the 
problem of favoritism. The problem is that the reason that the governor 
gives for the pardons isn’t the reason he should have given. I am not 
sure exactly what to call this disconnect, but for the sake of 
convenience, let us say that there is a sincerity constraint on pardoning: 
the actual reasons for pardons have to be the good and sufficient reasons 
for the pardons. No other reasons will do.76 It seems to me the weakest 
form of wrongdoing that can be committed in a mass pardons case; it 
also seems to me that this type of wrong will usually be accompanied by 
some actual favoritism that leaves some deserving individuals without 
                                                                                                                     
16herbert.html?_r=0. 
 74. See, e.g., Barbara Herman, On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty, 90 PHIL. 
L. REV. 359, 362 (1981) (providing an exposition of Kant). 
 75. For a similar sentiment, see Nathanson, supra note 72, at 157. 
 76. For a good explanation of the value of sincerity, and the related concept of publicity, 
see Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987, 1005–08 (2008).  
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pardons.77  
B.  Barbour’s Pardons Revisited 
At the time of Barbour’s pardons, there was widespread outrage.78 
Part of this, indeed probably most of it, was because of individual 
pardons: the murderers who were pardoned when the wounds from their 
crimes were not yet healed.79 But I also think there was a larger 
disillusionment with Barbour’s pardons, which came not from analyzing 
each case one at a time and deciding that the pardon in that case was not 
warranted. After all, it seems very likely that some of the pardons were 
justified by good and sufficient reasons: the ones who needed medical 
release, for example, or those who were convicted long ago for minor 
drug possession, and who wanted to be able to vote, or have an easier 
time getting a job. 
Yet many condemned the pardons as a whole, and the above section 
may explain why this happened. Consider the antidiscrimination norm. 
Two-thirds of those Barbour pardoned were white, while two-thirds of 
the Mississippi prison population is black.80 Overwhelmingly, you had a 
better chance at a pardon if you were white than if you were black. This 
at least gives the appearance that Barbour violated the 
antidiscrimination norm, if not intentionally, at least as a matter of 
discriminatory effects. Indeed, the pardons might have been part of a 
deeper, structural racism in the entire process of pardoning, from the 
recommendation by the parole board for pardons to the granting of the 
pardons themselves. Even if Barbour did not knowingly pardon more 
whites than blacks (he was not aware of the race of those he pardoned), 
the pardons may still have been the product of racism, and so 
problematic for that reason.81 
                                                                                                                     
 77. That is to say, it will not usually be the case that the class of those who deserve to be 
pardoned will always be coextensive with the class of those who are friends of the governor.  
 78. Keen, supra note 7; Mark Memmott, Hundreds of Pardons, Some for Killers, Spark 
Outrage in Mississippi, NPR (Jan. 11, 2012, 1:08 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-
way/2012/01/11/145039829/hundreds-of-pardons-some-for-killers-spark-outrage-in-mississippi; 
P.S. Ruckman Jr., Op-Ed., Barbour’s Last-minute Rush to Pardon, CNN (Jan. 12, 2012, 4:41 
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/12/opinion/ruckman-haley-barbour-pardons/?hpt=us_c2.  
 79. See Memmott, supra note 78; Julia Dahl, 8 of the Murderers Barbour Pardoned 
Killed Their Wives, Girlfriends, CRIMESIDER (Jan. 13, 2012, 2:13 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-57358839-504083/8-of-the-murderers-haley-barb 
our-pardoned-killed-their-wives-girlfriends. 
 80. See Jonsson, supra note 8. 
 81. One commentator has opined:  
Perhaps more than incarceration rate disparities, however, pardon rate 
inconsistencies suggest that biases may be less individual and more systemic. 
In Mississippi, for example, black prisoners, on the whole, have fewer 
resources than white prisoners, including access to personal lawyers, which 
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There might have also been the perception that the pardons were 
arbitrary, that they were simply indiscriminately given. The person who 
Barbour happened to get to know as a trusty was pardoned, but one who 
did similar service, and committed a similar crime, was not. Or a 
convicted criminal who was able to get the Governor’s ear because he 
had a relative working for Barbour might have gotten a pardon, but one 
who had no connections to Barbour did not. Or further, someone who 
could afford to hire an attorney to lobby Barbour got a pardon, but 
someone without money and an attorney did not. 
Pardons that are given on such an indiscriminate or random basis 
might be thought to be unfair, because they treat those who are similarly 
situated differently based on morally arbitrary factors.82 It becomes a 
matter of mostly chance whether you would be pardoned: whether you, 
or someone close to you, knew someone who could get the Governor’s 
ear. But chance shouldn’t be the deciding factor. The only deciding 
factor should be whether there were good and sufficient reasons for the 
pardon. In other words, the reason for the pardon should be the good 
and sufficient reason for the pardon and not any other reason.  
So people may have been reacting to the apparently arbitrary nature 
of many of Barbour’s pardons. The pardons seemed not to have been 
made in any sort of orderly or reasoned manner.83 Even if many of those 
pardoned were pardoned for good and sufficient reasons, there may 
have been others who were not pardoned but who should have been, 
                                                                                                                     
may have led to fewer black prisoners requesting a pardon in the first place. 
Id. Professor Stephen Nathanson has also noted:  
What I want to stress here is that the arbitrariness and discrimination need not 
be purposeful or deliberate. We might discover, as critics allege, that racial 
prejudice is so deeply rooted in our society that prosecutors, juries, and judges 
cannot free themselves from prejudice when determining how severe a 
punishment for a crime should be. Furthermore, we might conclude that these 
tendencies cannot be eradicated, especially when juries are called upon to make 
subtle and complex assessments of cases in the light of confusing, semi-
technical criteria. Hence, although no one decides that race will be a factor, we 
may predict that it will be a factor, and this knowledge must be considered in 
evaluating policies and institutions. 
Nathanson, supra note 72, at 160 (emphasis in original). 
 82. See Robertson & Saul, supra note 6 (“Many of the applications contain the type of 
recommendations that a poor person could be hard-pressed to collect: character references from 
state legislators or local elected officials. . . . In other cases, applicants relied on someone who 
had the connections they lacked.”). 
 83. See Ruckman Jr., supra note 78 (“The signs of a last-minute rush abound. Well over 
half of the warrants do not even provide the specific sentences that were handed down by the 
courts. Other critical dates are missing right and left.”).  
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because there were also good and sufficient reasons for pardoning 
them.84 It at least looked as if Barbour might not have been entirely 
consistent in choosing whom to pardon.  
But with Barbour, it was worse than simply appearing inconsistent. 
The pardons Barbour made didn’t seem to be based merely on chance 
but were instead made for the wrong sort of reasons. They were made 
because of connections to the Governor, whether these were personal, 
familial, or the result of lobbying. It wasn’t as if Barbour held a lottery 
to see who would get pardoned; this would still be unfair, but the 
unfairness might be of a lesser degree. Rather, the people who were 
pardoned (it seemed) had a connection to the Governor. In fact, it was 
as if the main factor in many cases was the existence of this 
connection.85 It would have been better if the pardons had been entirely 
random; still morally problematic, but better.  
If this were true in many cases, and not just one or two, then this 
provides another reason for criticizing the pardons as a whole, even if 
they can be justified case-by-case. For if the mode of distributing the 
pardons is not just arbitrary, but based on favoritism, then the pardons 
as a whole may be problematic, not because there are not good and 
sufficient reasons for them (we are assuming there might be) but 
because of the way they are given out. A bad mode of distribution 
(connections to the Governor) might put into question all of the 
pardons, even pardons that could have been justified for good and 
sufficient reasons.86  
C.  Some Recent Presidential Pardons 
A recent, searching report by the public interest group ProPublica 
has raised questions about presidential pardons. The report reflects, on a 
smaller scale, the problems that were noted in relation to Barbour’s 
pardons.87 The two conclusions of the study, which were reported in the 
Washington Post, were that the pardons granted by George W. Bush 
heavily favored whites, and that “political influence . . . continued to 
boost pardon applicants.”88 The study conducted by the authors was 
based on a random sample of five hundred people out of the nearly two 
thousand people who had requested pardons during Bush’s 
                                                                                                                     
 84. See Robertson & Saul, supra note 6 (giving examples of similarly situated convicts 
who were not pardoned).  
 85. Id. 
 86. To be sure, a bad mode of distribution can be present even in one pardon; but when it 
is done with many pardons, the badness of it becomes more evident (as was the case with 
Barbour).  
 87. See LINZER & LAFLEUR, supra note 29. 
 88. Id. at 30.  
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presidency.89 
The number pardoned by Bush during his entire presidency was 189, 
a little less than the total number that Barbour pardoned in the final days 
of his governorship.90 Yet they seem to reflect writ small what 
Barbour’s pardons display writ large: when taken as a whole, pardons 
can be problematic in a way they are not when they are taken 
individually. The authors at ProPublica show this point by a series of 
careful comparisons, between, say, a white woman who attempted to 
defraud the IRS of more than $25,000 who received a pardon, and an 
African-American beauty shop owner who was convicted of 
underreporting her income, who did not.91 The report’s authors also 
investigate in detail a case where a donation to a congressman helped 
secure a last-minute pardon.92  
Those in the Bush Administration expressed surprise at the result, 
and insisted that the process was “colorblind.”93 And we may think that 
the real problem here is the paucity of pardons (something that has 
continued with a vengeance into the Obama Administration),94 and not 
necessarily their basis, a point to which Part III returns. Another 
problem may involve disagreement about the appropriate criteria for 
selecting people for pardons. The Bush Administration’s officials 
apparently took marriage as a key factor in signaling whether an 
offender had been rehabilitated or not, as showing greater “stability.”95 
But the officials also looked to more amorphous factors such as 
“attitude,” which could open the door to all sorts of bias or could give 
leeway to favor some over the others based on political pressure.96 
There was, in fact, one instance of patent racial bias in Bush’s 
consideration of a pardon for a Nigerian minister.97 
                                                                                                                     
 89. Id. at 19.  
 90. Id. at 5; Campbell Robertson, Mississippi Governor, Already Criticized on Pardons, 
Rides a Wave of Them Out of Office, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2012, at A13, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/11/us/gov-haley-barbour-of-mississippi-is-criticized-on-wave 
-of-pardons.html?_r=0 (noting that Barbour pardoned a total of 193 criminals). 
 91. LINZER & LAFLEUR, supra note 29, at 51.  
 92. Id. at 280 (noting the pardon efforts of luxury car dealer Dale Critz Jr. helped by 
donations to Republican Representative Jack Kingston).  
 93. Id. at 90, 493.  
 94. David Jackson, Obama Not a ‘Pardoning’ Kind of President, USA TODAY (Nov. 2, 
2012, 5:31 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/theoval/2012/11/02/obama-mitt-romney-
pardons/1676909 (“Obama has pardoned only 22 individuals during his time in office, while 
denying 1,019 other clemency requests.”). Obama’s pardon rate is the lowest among any 
modern president. Id.  
 95. LINZER & LAFLEUR, supra note 29, at 102. 
 96. Id. at 71.  
 97. See id. at 215; see also Alison Gender, Furor over Bush Lawyer’s Racism in 
Deportation Case of Nigerian Minister, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 14, 2008, 10:57 PM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/furor-bush-lawyer-racism-deportation-case-nigerian-
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A final, notorious example might also be worth mentioning. In 2007, 
George W. Bush commuted the sentence of I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, 
saving Libby from having to serve 2.5 years for his role in leaking the 
identity of Central Intelligence Agent Valerie Plame.98 In his remarks 
defending the pardon, Bush said that a thirty-month prison sentence for 
Libby was “excessive.”99 Reportedly, Vice President Dick Cheney was 
furious that Bush did not give Libby a complete pardon (Libby still 
owed a $250,000 fine and remained a convicted felon).100 Although 
many conservatives felt that Libby’s fine was a miscarriage of justice 
(liberals disagreed), it seems clear that without Libby’s close connection 
to the President and the Vice President he would probably not have 
even been a candidate for a pardon. In short, whatever the individual 
merits of the Libby case, it certainly was a pardon based on favoritism.  
And it seems fair to say that in many other cases, and not just in the 
Libby case, Bush’s pardons were as problematic as Barbour’s. Even 
though Bush may have granted most of the pardons for good and 
sufficient reasons, the way that Bush pardoned en masse showed 
problems of bias, of favorable treatment, and of sheer arbitrariness. 
These pardons show that a theory of pardons needs to regulate the 
pardoning process as a whole, because sometimes a pardon is wrong 
only when compared to other instances of pardons granted or not 
granted. 
III.  TOWARD A SECOND-BEST THEORY OF PARDONS 
The second and third parts of this Article, taken together, frame a 
dilemma that arises in many real-world pardons. On the one hand, some 
pardons will be clearly justified by good and sufficient reasons. So, for 
example, an executive is justified in pardoning when an innocent person 
has been convicted and sentenced, or when the sentence is too harsh. 
But, if an executive pardons only some of those whom the executive has 
good and sufficient reasons to pardon, and selects pardon recipients 
along some forbidden ground (race or favoritism) or randomly, then 
even individually justified pardons can become morally problematic. 
The result is cases such as those examined in the last part: where even 
                                                                                                                     
minister-article-1.349796. 
 98. See Bush Commutes ‘Scooter’ Libby’s Prison Sentence, FOXNEWS.COM (July 2, 2007), 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,287780,00.html.  
 99. Scott Shane & Neil A. Lewis, Bush Commutes Libby Sentence, Saying 30 Months ‘Is 
Excessive,’ N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/03/washington/03 
libby.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 100. Thomas M. DeFrank, Ex-VP Dick Cheney Outraged President Bush Didn’t Grant 
‘Scooter’ Libby Full Pardon, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 17, 2009, 11:00 AM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/ex-vp-dick-cheney-outraged-president-bush-didn-g 
rant-scooter-libby-full-pardon-article-1.370889.  
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facially “good” pardons, when distributed on a “bad” basis, become 
suspect. In an ideal world, an executive would pardon all those who 
should be pardoned, and not make choices on whom to pardon for 
invidious or arbitrary reasons. 
But this does not always happen, so we need a way to assess when 
pardons are both good and bad: good because they serve the demands of 
justice in individual cases, or bad because they might also involve some 
other unfairness. To do this, Part III employs John Rawls’s language of 
“ideal” and “nonideal” theory, a distinction closely related to the idea of 
“second-best” theory. Pardons are nonideal or second-best in two ways. 
First, they are second-best, because in an ideal world, we would never 
need to pardon: the laws would be fair, and the sentences given would 
be just. But pardons can be second-best in another way, too. Pardons 
can be granted in ways that do not accord with our considered notions 
of fairness.  
Prevailing justifications of the pardoning power focus too much on 
the way that pardons can correct individual mistakes in the criminal 
justice system; but the justifications have taken too little notice of the 
way in which pardons can introduce new kinds of injustices in the way 
they are distributed. So we have to be able to judge pardons along both 
individual and collective lines, and to explain how sometimes individual 
pardons can be unjustified for reasons that are unrelated to the justice of 
the particular case. This part, in introducing the distinction between 
ideal and nonideal theory, attempts to give us the tools to do just that.  
A.  Ideal and Nonideal Theory 
“Ideal theory” was developed by John Rawls, in his now classic 
Theory of Justice.101 Rawls used the term to structure his political 
philosophy as a whole. Rawls attempted to sketch his picture of an ideal 
society, a “realistic utopia,”102 as he called it: a society that was (as 
much as possible for humans) perfectly just. In so doing, Rawls made 
certain assumptions. The key assumption was that everyone would 
comply with the law.103  
If total compliance is taken as the sine qua non of ideal theory, then 
there cannot be a full ideal theory of criminal justice.104 If people obey 
                                                                                                                     
 101. RAWLS, supra note 20, at 245–48 (discussing ideal and nonideal theory). 
 102. See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 128 (1999) (“By showing how the social 
world may realize the features of a realistic utopia, political philosophy provides a long-term 
goal of political endeavor, and in working toward it gives meaning to what we can do today.”). 
 103. RAWLS, supra note 20, at 25 (“[F]or the most part I examine the principles of justice 
that would regulate a well-ordered society. Everyone is presumed to act justly and to do his part 
in upholding just institutions.”).  
 104. Id. (putting “such topics as the theory of punishment” in nonideal, or “partial 
compliance,” theory).  
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the law, they will never be tried or punished, and so we will not need a 
complete understanding or description of the criminal justice system. 
This explains, in part, Rawls’s focus in his book on problems of 
distributive (and later, social) justice and his almost complete disregard 
of questions of crime and punishment.105 Fortunately, however, we can 
still use Rawls’s distinction between ideal and nonideal theory. 
We can speak, almost in plain language terms, of ideal theory as 
describing that which comes close to embodying, or embodies, our idea 
of a perfectly just society. We can then speak of our society, in contrast, 
as a nonideal one. The main point that this Article borrows from Rawls 
is this: the rules that govern a nonideal society will differ from those 
that govern an ideal society, because some things that are necessary to 
get to the ideal society may no longer be permissible once we achieve 
the ideal society.106 We may have to permit some things in the nonideal 
society, in other words, as a way of getting closer to the ideal society.  
Rawls’s book is short on examples, and his discussion of nonideal 
theory is no exception. He considers the possibility that slavery or 
serfdom, given some economically distressed regimes, could be 
permissible for a time, until securing the basic liberties was 
economically feasible. He also proposes that certain restrictions on 
democracy could be justified as a matter of nonideal theory.107 Rawls 
makes two points by means of these examples.  His first point is that 
in certain circumstances, the rules of an ideal society can’t govern a 
nonideal society directly, because if they did, that society would never 
get to the ideal. The people would starve before the society ever had a 
functioning constitutional democracy, for example. In a way, nonideal 
theory says that you can bend the ideal rules if you need to, that is, if it 
is necessary to one day get to the ideal society.  
But Rawls also has a second point which is that even when a society 
departs from the ideal, nonideal theory must nonetheless aim for the 
ideal. You can bend the ideal rules in some circumstances, but not to the 
point of breaking them. Nonideal theory has to take ideal theory as its 
guide, because, after all, the point of bending the rules is to get us closer 
to the ideal society. Ideal theory constrains nonideal theory not 
absolutely, but by presenting a standard that the nonideal society tries to 
approximate.108 Not anything goes when circumstances are less than 
                                                                                                                     
 105. I examine this point further in Chad Flanders, Punishment and Political Philosophy: 
The Case of John Rawls (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).  
 106. RAWLS, supra note 20, at 279.  
 107. Id. (intending to apply these examples to cases of economically developing societies).  
 108. Here the massive literature on rules and standards is relevant. See, e.g., Kathleen M. 
Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992). Nonideal theory is 
the realm of standards; ideal theory deals with rules—or at least to a rough approximation. See 
also Tamar Schapiro, Compliance, Complicity, and the Nature of Nonideal Conditions, 100 J. 
PHIL. 329, 335 (2003).  
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ideal: there will be some point where we have to obey the ideal 
The puzzle then becomes: how do we determine when departures 
from the ideal rules are permissible and when they are not? We could 
imagine one extreme, saying that departures were never permissible, but 
this would just be to reject the possibility of nonideal theory. At the 
other extreme we could simply give up on ideal theory and just balance 
on each occasion. But this extreme is also unpalatable, because we need 
a conception of what we are aiming for in order to give content to our 
balancing. 
There can be no general answer to this puzzle. The notion of “ideal 
theory” is at the end of the day a useful metaphor to think about how to 
reform society for the better. Should we think mostly in terms of aiming 
towards an ideal society? Or should we think instead in terms of 
eliminating obvious injustices?109 In the case of pardons, I think it is 
best to think in terms of an ideal we are aiming for: the ideal that we 
have a criminal justice system that both operates fairly for all and does 
not unjustly punish anyone. So we have to ask, what measures can we 
use to arrive at this ideal without sacrificing the ideal in the process? 
Ideal theory helps us show what is at stake when offenders are pardoned 
for morally arbitrary reasons, like race or favoritism. Ideal theory shows 
that there may be something wrong with a pardon, even if that pardon in 
the individual case is done for good and sufficient reasons.  
B.  Applying Nonideal Theory to Pardons 
Barbour’s pardons were not condemned universally. Some praised 
Barbour’s conversion from a strict law-and-order man to one who was 
capable of forgiveness, showing his Christian side.110 Others, including 
the prominent civil rights lawyer John Payton, hailed Barbour’s large 
number of pardons as (merely) putting a dent in mass incarceration. The 
main problem was that Barbour had not gone far enough. Barbour's 
pardons were only a drop in the bucket, Payton said.111 
Importantly, Payton’s perspective puts Barbour’s pardons in the 
larger context of the injustice of America’s criminal justice system as a 
whole. It is almost universally agreed that too many people are in 
prison, for too long, and for relatively minor offenses.112 Recent 
declines in the prison population only serve to highlight how far we 
have to go. Moreover, the stigma and the harms of those offenses persist 
                                                                                                                     
 109. Amartya Sen is the most notable exponent of this position. See AMARTYA SEN, THE 
IDEA OF JUSTICE (2009).  
 110. Gill, supra note 58 (defending Barbour in part on religious grounds).  
 111. See E.R. Shipp, What’s All the Fuss About in Mississippi?, ROOT (Jan. 30, 2012, 12:16 
AM), http://www.theroot.com/views/whats-all-fuss-about-mississippi?page=0,1. 
 112. For references, see Chad Flanders, Retribution and Reform, 70 MD. L. REV. 87, 87 & 
n.3 (2010). 
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well beyond prisoners' release: they struggle to receive aid and find 
jobs, and often cannot vote.113 Again, it is very probable that some if not 
all of Barbour’s pardons were done for good and sufficient reasons. And 
again, most of the offenders were not those who were just released from 
prison; rather they had been released for years, had reformed 
themselves, and were trying to shed the burden of a past conviction.  
This is in a way to repeat what Part II suggested: probably many of 
Barbour’s pardons could have been justified by good and sufficient 
reasons. But if these pardons were so justified, then they were, 
according to Moore, matters of justice. It was unjust that these people 
should have suffered from their sentences, and it was a matter of justice 
that Barbour should pardon them. The Barbour pardons were at least in 
some cases done in the interests of making sentences just. Then how 
could they simultaneously be wrong?  
It may be useful at this point to step back, and to consider the 
problem more abstractly. Suppose that we lived in an ideally just 
society, where the criminal law was just and fairly administered. In this 
society, all or nearly all trials would result in the conviction of the guilty 
and punishment according to desert.114 Still, there would necessarily be 
some mistakes in the administration of justice, where people slipped up, 
not necessarily intentionally, but as a matter of simple human error. 
In an ideal society, where errors are relatively infrequent, we might 
see the importance of the pardon power as patching some of the flaws in 
the system to make a mostly or nearly just society closer to being a 
perfectly just society. Pardons are one way to do this. Other areas of 
discretion, in the hands of the police, the prosecutor, or the jury, could 
also patch flaws.115 Pardons and these other measures would be, as 
many have stated, necessary “safety valves” to the workings of the 
criminal justice system, to account for human fallibility. Note, however, 
that these would be entirely legalistic pardons, in Moore’s use of the 
term. They would be pardons when human actors failed to follow (to the 
letter) the theoretically just laws and punishments. 
Now suppose we live in a nonideal society in which many criminal 
laws themselves are irrational or unjust, sentencing is too harsh, 
mandatory minimums are the norm, and past imprisonment harms 
offenders far past the date of their release. In such a world, which is 
                                                                                                                     
 113. See Zachary Hoskins, Ex-Offender Restrictions, 30 J. APPLIED PHIL. (forthcoming 
2013) (manuscript at 1), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/japp.12028/pdf.  
 114. On this, see CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS pt. 1, § 46, at 84 
(Aaron Thomas ed., Aaron Thomas & Jeremy Parzen trans., University of Toronto Press 2008) 
(1764) (“[C]lemency, a virtue that for sovereigns has sometimes served as a supplement to all 
the duties of the throne, should be excluded from the perfect legal code, in which punishments 
would be mild and the method of judgment regular and expeditious.”). 
 115. Barkow groups these points of discretion in her essay on administrative law and the 
demise of mercy. Barkow, supra note 14, at 1339–40. 
31
Flanders: Pardons and the Theory of the “Second-Best”
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
1590 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
very near (or identical) to our world, the regular use of “safety valves” 
would be especially important.116 We might actively call for greater use 
of safety valves, including jury nullification117 or pardons for everybody 
on death row.118 What’s more, the use of these safety valves would be 
amply justified as a way to mitigate, if not eliminate, the harshness of 
the criminal justice status quo. Barbour’s pardons can certainly be seen 
in this light, even if it is only a drop in the bucket. It is probably true 
that in our society, as many have argued, the pardon power should be 
used more often and more aggressively.119 So again, what is the 
problem with Barbour’s pardons given that we live in such a nonideal 
world? 
The problem, in a sentence, is that although pardons (and other 
safety valves) can be used as means of achieving a substantively just 
society, there comes a point at which the discriminatory or 
indiscriminant use of the pardon power conflicts with the ideal of the 
just society. This is what arguably happened in the case of Barbour. It 
does no honor to the goal of a racially fair justice system to 
disproportionately pardon members of the white race. And it does not 
support the idea that justice is nonarbitrary to assign pardons in a 
seemingly random manner. Further, a just criminal law is not promoted 
when the law is found to bend in favor of family or those with money.  
The larger point is that the way the criminal justice system is patched 
up, or reformed, must be on the whole consistent with the values of an 
ideal criminal justice system. This seems especially important when 
those reforms are made in a large-scale manner, as was the case with 
Barbour’s pardons. In short, there are constraints on acting justly in 
pursuit of a more perfectly just society. These are the constraints that, to 
use John Rawls’s terminology, ideal theory places on actors in the real 
world.  
If pardons are to be given, they should ideally be given for good and 
sufficient reasons, and should be distributed because of only those 
reasons. That means that pardons cannot be distributed in other ways, 
ways that might be racially biased, arbitrary, or based on favoritism. If 
pardons are distributed in these ways, then they go against the larger 
ideals of criminal justice, and for that reason, are morally suspect, if not 
morally impermissible. 
Of course, in the real world, pardons will never be perfectly fair. 
Like cases will not always be treated in a like manner. Some 
                                                                                                                     
 116. Gill, supra note 58 (“The pardon power is often the only remedy for those who have 
been unfairly or excessively punished in the harsh and inflexible sentencing system we have 
spent 30 years building. Pardons and commutations can correct some of these injustices.”). 
 117. See generally Paul Butler, In Defense of Jury Nullification, 31 LITIG. 46 (2004).  
 118. See Markel, supra note 61, at 410. 
 119. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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arbitrariness seems inevitable in a system administered by human 
beings and not by machines. It will also be very difficult, if not 
impossible, to compare cases along a common metric. This should not 
be a barrier to allowing any pardons, as the next section explains in 
greater detail. It is only when the moral arbitrariness is so large as to be 
obvious that it becomes a problem, when there does not seem to be any 
semblance of following a uniform procedure or standards for offering 
pardons. This means that, even if in one sense pardons are permissible 
acts of justice, in another sense they are not, insofar as justice also 
ideally requires consistency and fairness among like cases. When 
pardoning decisions fail to adhere to these ideals, they are morally 
problematic, even when they individually have good and sufficient 
reasons behind them.  
C.  Two Important Qualifications 
Two qualifications are necessary to clarify the above implications. 
The first qualification is that the constraints placed by nonideal theory 
still leave considerable room for pardoning. We can pardon all those we 
have good and sufficient reasons to pardon, provided that we do so with 
minimal bias (no overt racism or favoritism or randomness). Of course 
there is not total room. At some place the constraints of ideal theory 
have to kick in. This leads to my second qualification: even when the 
constraints kick in, there may be some cases where we decide that those 
constraints must be abandoned. We might decide that the present 
injustice is so great that even ideal theory has to give way, and that the 
force of the reasons underlying the individual pardons outweighs the 
fact that the pardon is arbitrary, racist, or insincere. 
A growing chorus over the past two decades has argued that 
executives, especially the President, have used the pardon power too 
sparingly. This chorus has grown to a roar over the number of pardons 
granted by Obama, one of the lowest of any president’s term.120 George 
W. Bush has also been criticized on this score. This Article joins this 
chorus. Given the injustice of the status quo there are many pardons that 
not only can be made for good and sufficient reasons, but morally ought 
to be made. 
So this Article should not be taken as a condemnation of the pardon 
power—far from it. As elaborated upon in Part I, there is a powerful 
moral case for the pardon power in many circumstances. Part II showed 
only that there are limits to the pardon power in the individual case and 
when we consider individually justified pardons as a whole. This raised 
the possibility that an executive’s pardons on the whole might be 
morally unjustified.  
                                                                                                                     
 120. Jackson, supra note 94. 
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But this is not the last word. The answer to objections about 
problematic on-the-whole pardons is an obvious one. Rather than not 
pardon at all, executives should level up.121 Instead of refusing to 
pardon because of fear of arbitrarily pardoning, one should, if anything, 
be more generous in granting pardons especially given the pervasive 
injustice in America’s criminal justice system.122 In the example 
referenced above about the two roughly situated individuals (one who 
evaded taxes and the other who committed tax fraud123) the answer to 
the question of which person should be pardoned is relatively easy: both 
should be. Generally, one arbitrary pardon does not render many 
legitimate pardons illegitimate. So executives, if anything, should 
generally be more generous in giving pardons, not less. It is only when, 
in cases such as Barbour’s, one senses that nearly all of the pardons 
were arbitrarily granted, that the problem of arbitrary pardons arises.  
What Barbour should have done was to level up across the board: he 
should have pardoned many more people, not fewer.124 He should have 
pardoned not only trusties but all the others on the pardon board’s list. 
He should, in short, have pardoned everyone who was justified in 
getting a pardon. But the problem is that he did not; he pardoned some 
people and failed to pardon others. And this leads to a question: Is there 
reason to think that the values of nonarbitrariness, nondiscrimination, 
etc., should outweigh the good and sufficient reasons Barbour may have 
had for pardoning those he did pardon? In other words, would it have 
been better for Barbour to have “leveled down” and pardoned no one 
rather than pardon those he did? There is a plausible case to be made 
that, yes, he should have. Sometimes the values of ideal theory should 
outweigh justice in individual cases, especially when the value of that 
justice is relatively minor.  
Most of the sentences Barbour commuted were already served; most 
of those who were suffering from their crimes were no longer suffering 
from the sentences per se, but from the stigma of their crimes. As 
Barbour hastened to point out, he freed very few people from prison.125 
The value that would actually come from the pardon would be mostly in 
avoiding the stigma (and associated harms) of conviction rather than 
avoiding the harm of unjust imprisonment; the person who had finished 
                                                                                                                     
 121. I am grateful to Ronen Avraham for emphasizing this point to me in correspondence. 
E-mail from Ronen Avraham, Professor in Law, Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, to Chad Flanders 
(Jan. 23, 2013) (on file with author).  
 122. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 123. See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text.  
 124. This may have only increased the outrage, but if all of the pardons were individually 
justified and no one was arbitrarily excluded from a pardon, then the outrage would have been 
unwarranted.  
 125. The title of Barbour’s Washington Post op-ed advertises this fact. See Barbour, supra 
note 11. 
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her term of years would now no longer be considered a “felon” in the 
eyes of the law thanks to Barbour’s pardons. In these cases, the ideals of 
ideal theory should probably win out, because the individual injustices 
that would be cured are relatively minor, and the violation of the values 
of consistency and fairness seemed patent. Of course, that does not 
make them any less unjust, nor does it mean that the best thing for 
Barbour to do would have been to pardon more people. 
Then we get to the cases that make up most of this Article’s 
examples,126 in which the death sentences of some were reduced to life 
in prison, but not for all of those who were similarly situated. Is the 
answer to this to not pardon any of them, and let them all be executed? 
Should the value of consistency win out even here?127 Certainly, this 
would not be the favored outcome: the favored outcome would be that 
none of them should be put to death. But then we have to ask, what if 
this outcome (for whatever reason) is unavailable? Does that mean that 
the second-best option to pardoning some is to pardon none? This 
sounds like an unacceptably harsh result. Arbitrary pardons in this case 
might be the true “second-best.” Better that some avoid death than all 
face the death penalty.  
In the 1970s, the arbitrariness and racial selectiveness of the death 
penalty was hotly debated: those who were against the death penalty 
vigorously argued that the randomness of the death penalty was a strong 
reason against it.128 But their counterparts replied that the remedy for 
randomness was to equally give more people the death penalty rather 
than to abolish the penalty altogether.129 This Article does not get into 
the particulars of this debate but only notes the similarity to the question 
above. On one side were those favoring the rule-of-law values of 
consistency and fairness. On the other side were those who favored the 
substantive justice of the death penalty in individual cases. Of course, in 
the death penalty debate, the rule-of-law values were supported by the 
death penalty opponents, and the substantive justice values by the 
proponents. But the structure of the debate seems similar to the question 
we are facing: in the case of the conflict, what should win, substantive 
justice or procedural values? 
There may be no general answer to this question in some extreme 
cases, including the death penalty. This Article uses the examples in 
                                                                                                                     
 126. See supra Section II.A. 
 127. One is reminded in this respect of the old adage that “consistency is the hobgoblin of 
little minds.”  
 128. See Nathanson, supra note 72 (arguing that the arbitrariness of the death penalty was a 
reason to oppose it).  
 129. See especially the contribution of Ernest van den Haag in ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG & 
JOHN P. CONRAD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A DEBATE 55–56 (1983) (arguing that the individual 
justice of executing one person was not affected at all by the fact that some escaped justice). 
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Part II to identify situations in which the use of pardons could be 
morally problematic, and not morally prohibited. Racism, favoritism, 
and arbitrariness seem to be strong reasons to question the justice of a 
punishment, whether a punishment is being imposed or removed. This 
is why in the race case, the awfulness of the discriminatory message 
sent by pardoning only whites might be sufficient to trump the 
substantive injustice (if it is one) of execution.130  
CONCLUSION 
Over the years there have been many proposals from both 
practitioners and academics to remove the pardon power from the 
executive or to reduce the power and give it to an independent board or 
commission.131 I am not sure this will happen, nor am I sure that it 
should. Boards would mean greater delays in pardons, something that is 
not always good; boards might also mean fewer pardons, as there might 
be disagreement about who ought to be pardoned. Executive power has 
historically meant the power for quick action, whether for good or for 
bad. In pardoning, quick action can often be desirable, necessary, and 
the best remedy. Some of the delay in recent pardons owes to too many 
layers of review, too much bureaucracy, and too many hands in the pot.  
But if we favor quick action, we need to be even clearer on the moral 
constraints that operate on anyone exercising the pardon power. Solving 
the question of who should pardon does not get us any closer to 
specifying what the ground rules for pardoning should be. Wherever the 
pardoning power rests, this Article has described an additional moral 
check on that power. The power should be considered good or bad not 
only individually, but also when we look at the pardons over time and 
as a whole. We should look at patterns, in other words, not just at 
cases—because pardons can be wrong not just in individual instances, 
but also when considered in groups.  
More generally, this Article proposes a framework for evaluating 
what we might call discretionary acts of justice throughout the criminal 
justice system, and not only in the executive. Those acts, too, should be 
considered in terms of whether they are, broadly speaking, consistent 
with an ideal theory of criminal justice. Do they help us bring about that 
ideal, in a way that reflects the values of that ideal? Or do they violate 
those values? Actors within the criminal justice system need to be 
mindful not only of how they act in a single case, but of what legal 
                                                                                                                     
 130. Again, I am only dealing with the case of guilty people who are given an unjust 
penalty. I think the calculus changes if we move to consider innocent people facing the death 
penalty. Then, it seems to me that justice would require saving anyone you could, even if this 
could only be done on morally arbitrary grounds.  
 131. See, e.g., Cara H. Drinan, Clemency in a Time of Crisis, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1123, 
1149 (2012). 
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virtues they display over time and across many cases. 
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